CVE-2026-129706 in vulnerability-lookupinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/16/2026

In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user's credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user's account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation.

The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application.

The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker's access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user's profile, subscriptions, and any role-gated functionality for the lifetime of the session cookie. Additionally, sessions that were opened via a feed key or API key before a prior fix (commit 3605d5b6) also persisted indefinitely.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026

The vulnerability identified in the Flask-Login based web application represents a critical failure in session management and credential revocation mechanisms. The core technical flaw stems from an improper implementation of the User.get_id() method within the user model, which returns only the bare numeric identifier associated with the user account rather than incorporating any dynamic or credential-bound data such as password hashes or timestamps. In secure authentication architectures, session identifiers must be tied to current credentials to ensure that changes in those credentials invalidate existing sessions. By relying solely on a static integer ID, the application creates persistent session tokens that are decoupled from the actual security state of the user account. This design choice violates fundamental principles of identity and access management where session validity should reflect the current authentication status of the principal.

The operational impact of this flaw is severe because it effectively nullifies standard password change procedures as a method for revoking unauthorized access. When an attacker obtains a valid session through vectors such as cross-site scripting, network sniffing in unencrypted channels, or exposure via API keys and feeds, they maintain full authenticated access to the victim's account indefinitely. This persistence holds true even if the legitimate user changes their password, performs account recovery, or requests an administrator-initiated credential reset. The application’s load_user callback accepts any session carrying a valid numeric ID without verifying that the credentials associated with that ID have not been altered since the session was created. Consequently, sensitive profile data, subscription details, and role-gated functionalities remain accessible to attackers long after the user has attempted to secure their account through standard remediation steps.

This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-613, which describes insufficient session expiration, as well as CWE-384 regarding session fixation implications where a fixed identifier is used without proper validation against credential changes. From an ATT&CK perspective, this flaw facilitates persistence and privilege escalation by allowing attackers to maintain footholds in compromised accounts despite defensive actions taken by users or administrators. The lack of binding between the session token and current credentials means that traditional incident response measures like password resets are ineffective for immediate threat containment. This is particularly dangerous in environments where API keys or feed tokens provide elevated access, as these sessions also persist indefinitely if established before prior mitigations were applied via specific code commits.

To mitigate this vulnerability, the application must be updated to ensure that session identifiers incorporate dynamic elements derived from user credentials, such as password hashes or versioned secrets that change upon credential updates. Implementing a mechanism where changing the password generates a new secret value and invalidates all existing sessions is essential for restoring proper access control hygiene. Additionally, introducing absolute expiration times for cookies alongside sliding expiration windows can limit the window of opportunity for attackers exploiting hijacked sessions. Regular auditing of session management logic against industry standards like OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet will help prevent similar architectural flaws in future development cycles and ensure that credential revocation functions as intended across all authentication pathways including API keys and feed tokens.

Responsible

CIRCL

Reservation

11/16/2026

Disclosure

11/16/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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