CVE-2026-55419 in reachy_mini
Summary
by MITRE • 08/25/2026
Reachy Mini is an SDK for controlling Reachy Mini robots. Prior to 1.8.2, the Reachy Mini daemon exposes the /api/media/sounds/upload endpoint implemented by the upload_sound method in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/media.py without authentication, file-extension checks, content validation, or size validation. The daemon binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and uses permissive CORS allow_origins=["*"], allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to upload arbitrary file types that are written to /tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>. Malicious files can compromise stored-data integrity and can serve as a foothold when combined with other vulnerabilities. This issue is fixed in version 1.8.2.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/25/2026
The Reachy Mini SDK, designed for controlling Reachy Mini robots, contained a critical security vulnerability in versions prior to 1.8.2 that exposed the system to unauthorized file uploads and potential remote code execution. The core of this issue lies in the implementation of the /api/media/sounds/upload endpoint within the daemon application. This endpoint was accessible without any form of authentication, meaning that any actor with network connectivity to the device could interact with it directly. Furthermore, the service bound itself to 0.0.0.0 by default, making it reachable from external networks rather than being restricted to local loopback interfaces. The combination of an unauthenticated interface and a publicly accessible binding creates a severe attack surface that allows remote adversaries to execute actions intended only for authorized administrators or trusted applications.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation on the file upload mechanism. When a user submits a request to the upload_sound method, the system fails to perform essential security checks such as verifying the file extension, validating the content type against expected media formats, and enforcing size limits. This lack of sanitization allows an attacker to bypass standard web application defenses that rely on client-side or basic server-side filtering. By exploiting this flaw, a malicious actor can upload arbitrary files with any extension, including executable scripts or binary payloads, directly into the /tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/ directory. The absence of content validation means there is no guarantee that the uploaded file matches its declared type, facilitating the storage of disguised malware under benign filenames.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data integrity issues. Because the files are written to a temporary directory with predictable paths and potentially permissive permissions, an attacker can use these uploads as a foothold for further exploitation. If other vulnerabilities exist within the system that allow file inclusion or command execution based on path traversal or variable manipulation, the uploaded malicious files could be executed remotely. This scenario aligns with CWE-434, which describes the unrestricted upload of files with dangerous types, and CWE-284, regarding improper access control. The ability to write arbitrary data to a system directory without authentication also relates to CWE-732, where incorrect permission assignments allow unauthorized modification or creation of critical resources.
In terms of threat modeling, this vulnerability facilitates attacks categorized under MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1508, which involves exploiting software dependencies and configurations for persistence or execution, and potentially T1196 if the uploaded files are used to establish a persistent backdoor. The permissive CORS configuration with allow_origins set to an asterisk further exacerbates the risk by allowing cross-origin requests from any domain, enabling attackers to craft malicious web pages that can automatically trigger upload attempts against the device without user interaction or browser security warnings typically associated with same-origin policy violations. This combination of misconfigurations significantly lowers the barrier for entry for automated scanning tools and opportunistic attackers targeting IoT devices on local networks.
To mitigate this vulnerability, it is imperative to upgrade the Reachy Mini SDK to version 1.8.2 or later, where these security controls have been implemented. In addition to upgrading, administrators should review network configurations to ensure that management interfaces are not exposed to untrusted networks by binding services to specific local IP addresses rather than all available interfaces. Implementing strict authentication mechanisms for all API endpoints is essential to prevent unauthorized access. Furthermore, application-level defenses such as validating file extensions against a whitelist of allowed media types, checking MIME content types server-side, and enforcing maximum upload size limits should be enforced even in updated versions to adhere to the principle of least privilege and defense-in-depth strategies. Regular security audits and penetration testing can help identify similar misconfigurations before they are exploited in production environments.