CVE-2026-58867 in Androidinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/02/2026

In getMessenger of WifiP2pServiceImpl.java, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026

The vulnerability identified in the getMessenger method within WifiP2pServiceImpl.java represents a critical security flaw rooted in insufficient access control mechanisms. Specifically, this issue stems from a missing permission check that allows unauthorized entities to interact with sensitive system services responsible for Wi-Fi Direct peer-to-peer communications. In Android architecture, service components often handle privileged operations such as network configuration and device discovery. When these internal methods fail to verify the caller's permissions before executing logic, they create an opening for privilege escalation attacks where lower-privileged applications or processes can invoke high-level functions intended only for system apps or users with elevated rights.

From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns closely with CWE-284 Improper Access Control and CWE-732 Permission Bypass. The absence of a verification step means that any application running on the device, regardless of its declared permissions in the manifest file, can potentially trigger the getMessenger endpoint. This bypasses the standard security model enforced by the Android operating system, which relies on explicit permission grants to restrict access to sensitive APIs and hardware interfaces. Since Wi-Fi Direct involves direct communication between devices without an intermediate access point, compromising this service could allow an attacker to manipulate network connections, intercept data, or establish unauthorized peer-to-peer links that bypass traditional firewall rules.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to its potential for local privilege escalation. An adversary with the ability to install and execute a malicious application on the target device can exploit this flaw without requiring any user interaction. This non-interactive nature makes it particularly dangerous in scenarios where users may be tricked into installing seemingly benign apps that contain hidden payloads targeting system services. Once exploited, the attacker gains elevated privileges within the context of the WifiP2pServiceImpl process, which typically runs with higher security levels than standard third-party applications. This elevation can serve as a stepping stone for further exploitation, such as accessing protected storage, reading sensitive user data, or pivoting to other parts of the system that rely on trusted service interactions.

This vulnerability also maps to specific techniques in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly those related to privilege escalation and defense evasion. By exploiting missing permission checks, an attacker can bypass security controls designed to isolate applications from each other and from core system functions. The lack of user interaction required for exploitation further exacerbates the risk, as it removes a common layer of human-based detection or prevention. Attackers often leverage such vulnerabilities in zero-click or low-interaction campaigns to maintain persistent access on compromised devices, especially in enterprise environments where Wi-Fi Direct might be used for file sharing or device management.

Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing strict access controls within the Android framework itself. The primary remediation involves implementing explicit permission checks using Context.checkCallingPermission() or similar mechanisms before allowing any external invocation of the getMessenger method. Developers should ensure that only applications with explicitly granted permissions, such as android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_DIRECT or equivalent system-level signatures, are allowed to interact with this service. Additionally, adopting a principle of least privilege ensures that services expose only the minimum necessary functionality to untrusted callers. Regular security audits and static analysis tools can help identify similar gaps in other parts of the codebase where permission verification might be overlooked.

For organizations deploying Android devices at scale, it is crucial to apply vendor-provided security patches promptly when they address this specific flaw. Device manufacturers must review their implementation of WifiP2pServiceImpl to ensure compliance with current security best practices and industry standards. Furthermore, runtime application self-defense (RASP) solutions can be employed to detect anomalous behavior patterns indicative of privilege escalation attempts, providing an additional layer of protection against exploitation even if the underlying code vulnerability remains unpatched in legacy systems. Continuous monitoring for unusual network activity originating from Wi-Fi Direct interfaces can also aid in early detection of potential exploits leveraging this weakness.

Responsible

Google Android

Reservation

07/02/2026

Disclosure

11/02/2026

Moderation

accepted

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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