CVE-2026-62003 in Mission Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Mission <= 1.22 versions.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified as an unauthenticated PHP object injection flaw within the Mission software prior to version 1.22 represents a critical security failure that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or manipulate application state without valid credentials. This type of vulnerability stems from the insecure deserialization process, where user-supplied input is directly passed into functions such as unserialize() in PHP environments without sufficient validation or sanitization. In modern web applications, object serialization is often used for session management, caching mechanisms, or passing data between different components of an application. However, when these serialized objects are derived from untrusted sources and subsequently deserialized by the server-side logic, it creates a pathway for attackers to inject malicious payloads that exploit existing classes within the PHP runtime environment.
The technical root cause lies in the lack of integrity checks on incoming data streams before they are processed into object instances. Attackers can craft specific serialized strings containing references to vulnerable classes with dangerous methods or properties. When the application attempts to deserialize this input, it instantiates these objects and may inadvertently trigger magic methods such as __wakeup(), __destruct(), or __toString(). These methods often contain logic that interacts with system resources, file systems, databases, or network connections. By carefully selecting which class and method to invoke through the serialized payload, an attacker can achieve remote code execution, leading to a complete compromise of the underlying server infrastructure. This is particularly dangerous because it bypasses traditional authentication mechanisms entirely, allowing any anonymous user on the internet to initiate the attack sequence.
From an operational perspective, the impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data exposure or defacement. Successful exploitation can result in full system takeover, where the attacker gains shell access with the privileges of the web server process. This enables lateral movement within the network, exfiltration of sensitive customer data stored in associated databases, and the installation of persistent backdoors for future unauthorized access. Furthermore, because the vulnerability is unauthenticated, it significantly lowers the barrier to entry for attackers, making automated scanning tools highly effective at identifying vulnerable instances across large networks. The presence of such a flaw indicates a fundamental weakness in the application's security architecture regarding input validation and secure coding practices during development.
This issue aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration identifier CWE-502, which describes Deserialization of Untrusted Data, as well as CWE-470 for Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code Paths. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability facilitates techniques related to Initial Access and Execution, specifically leveraging server-side request forgery patterns or direct code injection via deserialization gadgets. The exploitation chain typically involves crafting a serialized payload that references a gadget class available in the application's dependency tree, sending it through an unauthenticated endpoint, and allowing the backend PHP engine to process it maliciously.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate action is required by upgrading Mission software to version 1.22 or later where these deserialization flaws have been addressed. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, administrators should implement strict input validation on all parameters that are used in serialization processes, ensuring that only expected data types and values are accepted. Additionally, employing allowlists for class names during deserialization can prevent the instantiation of arbitrary objects. It is also recommended to disable dangerous PHP functions if they are not strictly necessary for application functionality and to ensure that error messages do not leak sensitive information about internal object structures or file paths which could aid attackers in crafting more effective payloads. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools should be integrated into the development lifecycle to detect such insecure deserialization patterns before deployment.