CVE-2026-119733 in Munshi
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
Munshi (by Petpooja) before 2026-07-07 contained a missing authorization vulnerability in its company deletion workflow at DELETE /api/companies/{company_id}, where the application fails to enforce the dedicated company_delete permission or verify company ownership. An authenticated invited sub-user with mere access to a company can exploit this flaw to perform a hard delete of the company record, causing irreversible loss of associated business data including invoices, configurations, and chat sessions.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The vulnerability identified in Munshi by Petpooja represents a critical failure in server-side access control mechanisms within the application's administrative workflow. Specifically, this flaw resides in the endpoint responsible for deleting company records via an HTTP DELETE request to /api/companies/{company_id}. The core technical deficiency is a missing authorization check that fails to validate whether the authenticated user possesses the specific permissions required to perform such a destructive action or verifies their ownership of the target resource. In secure application design, particularly in multi-tenant SaaS environments like Petpooja's platform, it is imperative that every state-changing operation undergoes rigorous verification against both role-based access control policies and object-level security attributes. The absence of these checks allows any authenticated user who has been granted basic access to a company context to bypass intended restrictions and execute administrative functions reserved for higher-privileged accounts or the primary account owner.
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-284, which describes Improper Access Control, specifically highlighting scenarios where authorization decisions are not enforced during critical operations. From an offensive security perspective, this aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it leverages legitimate credentials to perform unauthorized actions that escalate privileges or compromise data integrity. The exploitation of this flaw does not require complex injection techniques or buffer overflows; rather, it relies on the logical gap in the backend validation logic. An attacker who has obtained valid authentication tokens for a sub-user account can directly manipulate API requests to target any company ID they are aware of or have access to view, effectively bypassing the intended hierarchical structure of user permissions within the application.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the irreversible nature of the action it enables. By exploiting the missing authorization check, an attacker can perform a hard delete on a company record. Unlike soft deletes which retain data for recovery purposes, a hard delete permanently removes the associated database entries and related files from the system storage. This results in catastrophic data loss affecting critical business operations managed through the platform. Specifically, all invoices generated by the affected company are destroyed, rendering financial records inaccessible and potentially violating regulatory compliance requirements such as GDPR or local tax laws that mandate data retention. Furthermore, essential configuration settings that define how the POS system operates are erased, requiring complete reconfiguration from scratch if backups exist. Chat sessions containing historical customer interactions and support tickets are also permanently lost, impacting customer relationship management efforts.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust authorization checks at both the application logic level and the API gateway layer. Developers should enforce strict role-based access control (RBAC) policies that explicitly define which user roles or permission sets are authorized to execute deletion operations on company resources. Additionally, object-level security measures must be implemented to verify that the authenticated user is the owner of the specific company instance being targeted before processing the delete request. This involves querying the database to confirm ownership relationships prior to executing any destructive SQL commands or file system deletions. To further enhance resilience, organizations should implement soft-delete mechanisms with configurable retention periods and immutable audit logs that record who initiated deletion requests, even if those attempts are blocked by security controls. Regular penetration testing focused on broken access control scenarios is recommended to identify similar logical flaws in other endpoints before they can be exploited in production environments.