CVE-2026-58945 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
In multiple locations, there is a possible side channel information leak due to improperly used crypto. This could lead to paired device information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The identified vulnerability represents a critical security flaw rooted in the improper implementation of cryptographic primitives within a pairing mechanism, leading to side-channel information leakage. Side-channel attacks exploit unintended information gained from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem rather than weaknesses in the algorithms themselves. In this context, the system likely fails to maintain constant-time execution for sensitive operations such as key derivation or comparison during device authentication. This deviation allows an attacker to observe variations in timing, power consumption, or electromagnetic emissions to infer secret keys or pairing credentials without directly breaking the cryptographic algorithm's mathematical strength. The flaw is not a logic error per se but rather a failure in implementation hygiene where computational complexity varies based on input data, thereby leaking bits of the shared secret over multiple observations.
This vulnerability enables an adversary to perform passive eavesdropping and subsequent offline analysis to reconstruct sensitive pairing information. Because the attack relies on side-channel leakage, it does not require any additional execution privileges on the target device, nor does it necessitate user interaction or social engineering tactics. An attacker positioned within physical proximity can capture these subtle signals during normal operation phases where devices attempt to establish a trusted connection. The lack of required user interaction significantly lowers the barrier for exploitation, allowing for automated and scalable attacks against vulnerable endpoints in public spaces or unsecured environments.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, primarily resulting in the disclosure of paired device information which compromises the integrity of trust relationships between devices. Once an attacker successfully extracts pairing credentials through side-channel analysis, they can impersonate legitimate devices within the ecosystem. This capability facilitates unauthorized access to protected resources, potential interception of encrypted communications if session keys are also derived from the compromised material, and manipulation of device behavior in IoT or mobile networks. The compromise undermines the fundamental assumption that paired connections remain secure against passive observers, effectively nullifying the confidentiality guarantees provided by the underlying cryptographic protocols when implemented incorrectly.
From a classification perspective, this issue aligns with CWE-208 Observable Timing Discrepancy under Information Exposure and potentially CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Key if the side-channel leads to key recovery. In terms of adversary tactics, it maps directly to ATT&CK technique T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie or more broadly T1602 Data from Configuration Repository depending on how pairing data is stored and utilized post-compromise. The attack vector falls under Initial Access via Network Service if the side-channel can be triggered remotely through network latency variations, though it is often local physical access dependent for high-fidelity timing attacks.
Mitigation strategies must focus on hardening cryptographic implementations against side-channel analysis. Developers should enforce constant-time algorithms for all sensitive operations involving secrets, ensuring that execution time does not depend on secret data values. Utilizing hardware security modules or trusted platform modules can provide isolated environments less susceptible to external observation of power and timing characteristics. Additionally, implementing random delays or blinding techniques during cryptographic computations can mask the actual processing times from potential observers. Regular security audits focusing specifically on implementation-level crypto flaws are essential, as standard vulnerability scanners often miss these subtle timing-based leaks. Organizations should also consider limiting the sensitivity of pairing data exposed to lower-privilege processes and employing multi-factor authentication for critical device pairings to reduce reliance solely on static cryptographic secrets.