CVE-2026-68590 in MT2716
Summary
by MITRE • 11/02/2026
In ip_stack, there is a possible out of bounds read due to improper input validation. This could lead to remote denial of service, if a UE has connected to a rogue base station controlled by the attacker, with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: MOLY01387180; Issue ID: MSV-5152.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/02/2026
The vulnerability identified in ip_stack represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper input validation mechanisms within the network stack processing logic. This specific defect allows for an out-of-bounds read condition, which occurs when the software accesses memory locations beyond the intended boundaries of allocated buffers due to insufficient checks on incoming data parameters. In the context of mobile telecommunications infrastructure, ip_stack is responsible for handling Internet Protocol packet processing and routing decisions. When a User Equipment device connects to a base station that has been compromised or spoofed by an attacker, the malicious entity can craft specific network packets containing malformed headers or payload structures designed to trigger this validation failure. The absence of rigorous boundary checks means that instead of rejecting invalid inputs safely, the system proceeds to read from memory addresses outside the designated buffer space.
This technical flaw directly facilitates a remote denial-of-service attack vector with minimal requirements for exploitation success. Because the vulnerability resides in the network stack processing layer, it does not require any prior authentication or elevated execution privileges on the target device. An attacker controlling a rogue base station can exploit this weakness simply by having a victim user equipment connect to their infrastructure. The lack of required user interaction further lowers the barrier to entry for potential adversaries, enabling automated and widespread attacks against connected devices within range of the compromised cell tower. Once triggered, the out-of-bounds read typically results in immediate application crashes or system instability, effectively rendering the device unable to process legitimate network traffic and thereby achieving a denial of service state.
From an industry standards perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-125, which defines Out-of-Bounds Read as accessing memory beyond the end of a buffer. This type of error is particularly dangerous in embedded systems and telecommunications equipment because it can lead to information disclosure if sensitive data from adjacent memory regions is leaked, or more commonly in this context, system crashes leading to service disruption. Furthermore, within the MITRE ATT&CK framework for mobile platforms, this exploitation technique corresponds to techniques involving network protocol manipulation and resource exhaustion attacks. The scenario described fits squarely into adversary tactics that leverage trusted connections to execute malicious actions without detection by standard security controls, highlighting the risks associated with trusting base station communications in unsecured environments such as those found near rogue cell sites or IMSI catchers.
Mitigation strategies must focus on strengthening input validation routines within the ip_stack module to ensure all incoming packet data is rigorously checked against expected length and format constraints before processing occurs. Developers should implement strict boundary checks for all buffer operations, ensuring that read indices are validated against allocated memory sizes. Additionally, deploying network intrusion detection systems capable of identifying anomalous traffic patterns from unauthorized base stations can provide an additional layer of defense. For end-users, awareness regarding the risks of connecting to unknown or suspicious cellular networks remains crucial, although technical patches remain the primary remediation path. The provided patch ID MOLY01387180 addresses these validation gaps by enforcing stricter parameter checks and preventing access to invalid memory regions during packet processing operations.