CVE-2026-21155 in Samsunginfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/16/2026

Out-of-bounds write in bootloader prior to SMR Nov-2026 Release 1 allows physical attackers to write out-of-bounds memory.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026

The vulnerability described constitutes a critical security flaw within the boot loader component of systems operating under specifications preceding the SMR November 2026 Release 1 update. This issue is classified as an out-of-bounds write, which represents a severe category of memory corruption errors where software writes data to a memory location outside the boundaries of the intended buffer or allocated region. In the context of boot loaders, this flaw is particularly dangerous because it occurs during one of the earliest stages of system initialization, before higher-level operating systems and their associated security mechanisms are fully operational. The presence of such an error indicates that the code responsible for initializing hardware and loading the kernel fails to perform adequate bounds checking on memory access operations, allowing data intended for a specific buffer to overwrite adjacent memory locations.

From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration identifier CWE-787, which defines out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities. The exploitation of this flaw typically requires physical access to the target device, as indicated by the threat model specifying that only physical attackers can leverage this condition. Physical proximity allows an attacker to interact directly with hardware interfaces such as debug ports, serial consoles, or external storage devices during the boot process. By manipulating input parameters or injecting malicious payloads into the memory space accessed by the vulnerable boot loader routine, an adversary can trigger the out-of-bounds write. This action may result in overwriting critical data structures, function pointers, or control flow mechanisms stored in adjacent memory regions. Such manipulation can lead to arbitrary code execution with the highest level of privileges available at that stage, effectively granting full control over the system before any security policies are enforced by the operating system.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is profound due to its location within the boot chain. Since the boot loader operates in a privileged mode and precedes the loading of the main operating system kernel, compromising it allows an attacker to subvert the entire trust chain established during device startup. This aligns with ATT&CK technique T1509, which covers modification of firmware or hardware configuration, as well as techniques related to early boot execution such as those found in the Pre-OS Attack phase of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for enterprise environments. An attacker exploiting this flaw could install a persistent rootkit that survives reboots and operates invisibly from standard security monitoring tools. Furthermore, because the vulnerability exists prior to the specified release date, any devices not updated with the SMR November 2026 Release 1 patch remain susceptible to these attacks. This creates a significant window of exposure for organizations relying on affected hardware configurations, potentially leading to data exfiltration, system hijacking, or complete denial of service if the memory corruption causes critical system instability during initialization.

Mitigation strategies must focus primarily on applying the vendor-provided firmware update corresponding to SMR November 2026 Release 1, which presumably includes code changes to enforce strict bounds checking and validate all input parameters before memory access operations are performed. For environments where immediate patching is not feasible due to operational constraints or supply chain delays, physical security controls become paramount. Organizations should restrict physical access to critical infrastructure hardware through locked server rooms, biometric authentication at entry points, and continuous surveillance of equipment racks. Additionally, enabling secure boot features can help mitigate some risks by ensuring that only signed and trusted code is executed during the boot process, although this may not fully prevent exploitation if the vulnerability allows modification of the bootloader itself before signature verification completes. Regular audits of physical access logs and monitoring for unauthorized hardware attachments are also recommended to detect potential attempts at exploiting this low-level memory corruption flaw.

Responsible

SamsungMobile

Reservation

12/11/2025

Disclosure

11/16/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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