CVE-2026-99308 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/16/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: xhci: Fix bounce buffer overflow

High-speed devices with out of spec 1024 byte bulk endpoints exist and are allowed by USB core, but xhci-hcd always sets packet size to 512. The exact nature of these devices isn't documented, commit fb5ee84ea72c ("USB: Accept bulk endpoints with 1024-byte maxpacket") only states that they "don't work with xHCI host controllers", whatever it means.

But somebody (or a malicious device) can try, and then the driver will allocate a 512 byte bounce buffer for this endpoint and may write up to 1024 bytes into it if particular scatter-gather URBs are used, because xhci_align_td() obtains packet size from the descriptor. Fix this.

As a side effect, TRBs will be aligned to the packet size chosen by the driver on all endpoints of all speeds. Alignment serves the xHC, not device, so this is fine. Only out of spec devices are affected anyway.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026

The Linux kernel's USB subsystem contains a critical buffer overflow vulnerability within the xHCI host controller driver that arises from a mismatch between hardware capabilities and software assumptions regarding endpoint packet sizes. Specifically, high-speed USB devices with bulk endpoints configured for 1024-byte maximum packets are technically permitted by the USB core specification, yet the xhci-hcd driver historically hardcoded the packet size to 512 bytes. This discrepancy creates a dangerous scenario where the driver allocates a bounce buffer sized at only 512 bytes based on its internal configuration, while the actual data transfer logic may attempt to write up to 1024 bytes into that same memory region if specific scatter-gather USB Request Blocks are utilized. The root cause lies in the xhci_align_td function, which retrieves the packet size from the device descriptor rather than adhering strictly to the driver's configured limit, leading to a classic buffer overflow condition when out-of-spec devices interact with the host controller.

This vulnerability represents a significant security risk as it allows for potential memory corruption and arbitrary code execution if an attacker can introduce or emulate such a malicious USB device. By connecting a device that advertises a 1024-byte bulk endpoint, an adversary could trigger the overflow during data transfer operations, potentially overwriting adjacent kernel memory structures. This aligns with CWE-120, which describes buffer copy without checking size limits, and falls under the ATT&CK technique of T1566.002 for Spearphishing Attachment if considered in a physical access scenario where an attacker physically plugs in a rogue device to exploit local kernel privileges. The impact extends beyond simple data corruption; successful exploitation could lead to system instability, denial of service, or complete compromise of the host machine depending on what memory regions are overwritten and how they are utilized by subsequent kernel operations.

The resolution involves correcting the driver's handling of packet sizes for these specific high-speed devices to ensure that buffer allocations match the actual data transfer requirements defined in the USB descriptors. By aligning the bounce buffer size with the descriptor-specified packet size, the driver prevents the out-of-bounds write operation. Additionally, as a side effect of this fix, Transfer Request Blocks are now aligned to the packet size chosen by the driver across all endpoints and speeds. This alignment serves the xHCI hardware requirements rather than device preferences, ensuring proper data handling without introducing new vulnerabilities. Only devices that deviate from standard specifications are affected by these changes, meaning compliant USB peripherals will continue to operate normally while mitigating the risk posed by non-compliant or malicious hardware implementations.

To mitigate this vulnerability in environments where physical access control is limited, it is recommended to apply the latest kernel updates provided by distribution maintainers immediately. Organizations should also enforce strict policies regarding the use of removable storage and USB devices through endpoint security solutions that can detect anomalous USB descriptor configurations or block unauthorized peripherals from connecting to critical systems. Regular auditing of connected hardware against known safe profiles further reduces the attack surface, ensuring that only trusted devices with compliant specifications are permitted to interact with the host controller infrastructure.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/16/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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