CVE-2026-99291 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/16/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix SMB2 CREATE response buffer overflow
smb2_allocate_rsp_buf() uses the MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE (448-byte) buffer for a single SMB2_CREATE response. That buffer also holds a 4-byte length field, which only leaves 444 bytes for the SMB2 body.
The AAPL response made this buffer too small. After 8f1b796ff113, a request with AAPL response contexts may need at least 456 bytes. In the 456-byte case, create_aapl_rsp_buf() is appended last, clears 128 bytes, and writes 12 bytes past the allocation.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in create_aapl_rsp_buf+0x31/0x6e0 Write of size 128 at addr ffff88800370954c by task kworker/0:0/9 ... create_aapl_rsp_buf+0x31/0x6e0 smb2_open+0x58f9/0xef10 ... smb2_allocate_rsp_buf+0x19d/0x370 ... The buggy address is located 332 bytes inside of allocated 448-byte region [ffff888003709400, ffff8880037095c0)
Reserve enough space for any fixed CREATE response KSMBD can build. Store the required allocation size in the per-dialect values table. This keeps the small buffer for other commands and avoids using the max transaction buffer for every CREATE.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026
The vulnerability identified as a slab-out-of-bounds write error within the Linux kernel's ksmbd module stems from an insufficiently sized response buffer during SMB2 CREATE operations involving Apple-specific (AAPL) response contexts. The core technical flaw resides in the smb2_allocate_rsp_buf function, which allocates a static small buffer defined by MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE, totaling 448 bytes. This allocation includes a four-byte length field at the beginning of the structure, effectively reducing the available space for the actual SMB2 protocol body to just 444 bytes. While this size was historically sufficient for standard CREATE requests, it became inadequate following specific code changes that introduced support for AAPL response contexts. These contexts are required when clients request Apple-specific file attributes or metadata extensions common in macOS environments interacting with Linux-based servers via the Server Message Block protocol.
The operational impact of this flaw is triggered specifically when a client sends an SMB2 CREATE request containing AAPL response context fields. In such scenarios, the create_aapl_rsp_buf function is invoked to append these additional data structures to the response buffer. This function attempts to clear 128 bytes and subsequently writes twelve bytes past that cleared region, resulting in a total write requirement of one hundred forty bytes for this specific component alone. Since only approximately two hundred thirty-two bytes remained available after accounting for other standard CREATE fields within the constrained four-hundred-forty-four-byte limit, the function proceeds to overwrite memory beyond the allocated boundary. Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN) reports confirm a write operation of one hundred twenty-eight bytes at an address located three hundred thirty-two bytes inside the forty-fourty-eight byte region, indicating a severe heap buffer overflow that corrupts adjacent kernel slab objects and potentially leads to system instability or arbitrary code execution if exploited by a malicious client.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-120, which describes Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input Classic Buffer Overflow, as the software fails to verify that the input data fits within the allocated buffer boundaries before performing memory writes. Furthermore, because it involves improper handling of user-controlled network protocol inputs leading to out-of-bounds memory access, it relates closely to CWE-787 in terms of its potential for exploitation through crafted packets sent over the network. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this flaw could be leveraged during initial access or privilege escalation phases if an attacker can force a server into processing malformed SMB2 CREATE requests with specific AAPL contexts to trigger memory corruption and potentially achieve remote code execution on the host system running the ksmbd service.
The resolution involves modifying the buffer allocation logic within smb2_allocate_rsp_buf to dynamically reserve sufficient space for any fixed CREATE response that ksmbd can generate, rather than relying on a static small buffer size that does not account for all possible context extensions. The fix introduces per-dialect values tables that store the required allocation sizes specific to each SMB dialect version supported by the server. This approach ensures that when AAPL or other extended contexts are present, the kernel allocates a larger buffer capable of holding the full response payload without overflow. Crucially, this change preserves the use of smaller buffers for standard commands where such extra space is unnecessary, thereby maintaining memory efficiency while eliminating the security risk associated with fixed-size allocations in variable-length protocol scenarios. Administrators should ensure that their systems are updated to include patches addressing this ksmbd buffer handling logic to prevent potential exploitation via crafted SMB2 traffic targeting Apple-specific extensions.