CVE-2026-21167 in Smart Switch
Summary
by MITRE • 11/16/2026
Binding to an unrestricted IP address in Smart Switch prior to version 3.7.74.7 allows adjacent attackers to bypass authentication. User interaction is required for triggering this vulnerability.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026
The identified vulnerability stems from a critical misconfiguration within the network management interface of Smart Switch software versions preceding 3.7.74.7, specifically involving the binding address of its administrative services. In secure system design, administrative interfaces should be bound to loopback addresses or specific internal network segments to ensure that access is restricted to authorized users on trusted networks. However, in this instance, the service was configured to bind to an unrestricted IP address, effectively listening on all available network interfaces including those exposed to adjacent local area networks. This configuration error creates a direct pathway for attackers located within the same broadcast domain or subnet to interact with the management plane without traversing any perimeter security controls such as firewalls that might otherwise restrict access based on source IP reputation or zone trust levels.
From a technical perspective, this flaw represents an improper binding of network services to untrusted interfaces, which is categorized under CWE-286: Improper Challenge-Response Authentication and CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or Function in the Common Weakness Enumeration framework. The unrestricted binding allows any device capable of Layer 2 adjacency to send HTTP requests directly to the administrative port. Because the service does not validate the source network context before initiating authentication challenges, it becomes susceptible to brute-force attacks and credential stuffing attempts that would typically be mitigated by network segmentation or access control lists in a properly hardened environment. The requirement for user interaction suggests that while the initial connection is possible without credentials, exploiting the vulnerability likely involves social engineering tactics where an attacker tricks a legitimate administrator into interacting with a malicious interface or clicking on a link that triggers specific administrative actions after gaining partial visibility through the unauthenticated endpoint.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it effectively nullifies network-level authentication barriers for adjacent attackers. An adversary positioned within the same subnet can potentially enumerate valid usernames, attempt credential guessing attacks without rate limiting protections typically enforced by gateway devices, or exploit subsequent logic flaws that may be exposed once a session is established. This bypasses the principle of least privilege and compromises the integrity of the management plane, which controls critical network infrastructure settings including routing protocols, VLAN configurations, and security policies. If an attacker successfully authenticates through this weakened boundary, they could reconfigure firewall rules to allow further lateral movement, intercept sensitive traffic via ARP spoofing facilitated by misconfigured switch ports, or deploy persistent backdoors within the network fabric.
To mitigate this risk, organizations running Smart Switch versions prior to 3.7.74.7 should immediately apply the vendor-provided patch that corrects the binding configuration. In addition to upgrading software, it is imperative to enforce strict access control lists on all managed switches and routers to restrict management plane traffic exclusively to designated administrative workstations or jump hosts. Network segmentation strategies such as Virtual LAN isolation for management interfaces further reduce the attack surface by ensuring that adjacent attackers cannot reach the vulnerable service even if they compromise an endpoint within the local subnet. Continuous monitoring of authentication logs for unusual patterns, combined with multi-factor authentication enforcement where supported, adds a vital layer of defense against credential-based exploitation attempts targeting this specific architectural weakness.